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The Perfect Circle: 
Arbitration’s Favors Become  
Its Flaws in an Era of  
Nationalization and Regulation 
Kimberly R. Wagner* 
INTRODUCTION 
Litigation attorneys are ever alert for the word “lawsuit,” the sound of 
which makes any other person cringe.  The image of a wood-paneled 
courtroom lorded over by a seasoned legal professional, however, has not 
always had such a poor reputation; it was once associated with such glorious 
ideas as “innocent until proven guilty” and “having a day in court.” 
The negative connotation linked to litigation1 stems from several 
entrenched and continuing problems, including high costs, the destruction of 
business relationships, and the unpredictability of the results,2 which are 
present in both domestic and foreign conflicts.  Additional problems arise 
 
*  Kimberly R. Wagner is a Juris Doctorate candidate at Pepperdine University School of Law and a 
Masters in Dispute Resolution candidate at the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, 2012.  She is 
also a Student Articles Editor for the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal. 
 1. The problems with litigation were evident even as early as the days of Abraham Lincoln, 
who observed 
 
the limitations of the legal process: crowded circuit court dockets, with court sessions in 
most counties limited to a few days a year; the difficulties of procuring evidence and 
witnesses; the unpredictability of local tribunals and juries; and the difficulties of 
executing on a debt in the face of a determined, recalcitrant debtor. 
 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Lincoln’s Lessons for Lawyers, 16 DISP. RESOL. MAG., no. 2, Winter 2010, 
at 18, 18 [hereinafter Lincoln’s Lessons]. 
 2. Andrew Sagartz, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriers 
of Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 678 (1998).  See also 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (“Th[e] 
dramatic decrease in the trial rate may be attributed, at least in part, to business and public concerns 
about the high costs and delays associated with full-blown litigation, its attendant risks and 
uncertainties, and its impact on business and personal relationships.”). 
1
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when these transactions span more than one country, forcing parties to 
decide on a forum, learn foreign procedures, and pay additional costs.3  The 
impracticality of international litigation was realized after World War II in 
the advent of an era characterized by global commercial cooperation.4  The 
three key issues that developed for foreign litigators were: fear of bias for 
the domestic party; questionable appealability in foreign fora; and potential 
lack of enforceability of a resulting judgment.5  Consequently, international 
parties sought a neutral alternative to alleviate these concerns and provide 
more efficient, effective results.6 
The goal of this article is to explore the evolution of international 
commercial arbitration, highlighting some of its specific aspects that have 
brought it under critical evaluation, and to analyze the viability of another 
ADR process—mediation—overtaking it in the international arena.  Part I 
gives a brief background on international arbitration and explains how it has 
become so prominent and respected in the global community.  It also focuses 
 
 3. Sagartz, supra note 3, at 678.  See also Bonnie S.C. Klotz, Practitioner’s Workshop: 
Practical Aspects of International and Foreign Law Litigation, 79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 328, 
329 (1985) (quoting remarks by Eleanor M. Fox, Professor of Law, New York University School of 
Law).  Ironically, some of the technological advances that make international transactions possible 
have contributed to the higher costs.  For example, computers and the electronic transmission of 
information have led to a rise in “e-discovery,” the gathering of archived information from electronic 
databases and networks.  Because of the massive amounts of data that is stored, expense and burden 
on the parties have significantly increased, prompting a response in 2006 from the Advisory 
Committee to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rachel Hytken, Electronic Discovery: 
To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy Their Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875 
(2008). 
 4. Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed Nationalization, 
Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in International Arbitration and the Need for More 
Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359, 362 (2008). 
 5. Id.  There was also the potential for simultaneous litigation in multiple countries regarding 
the same issue, which would affect enforceability as well.  Winston Stromberg, Avoiding the Full 
Court Press: International Commercial Arbitration and Other Global Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Processes, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2007). 
 6. For US attorneys, litigation as an international resolution option did not go quietly, and 
arbitration was forced to look to Congress for some teeth; consequently, Congress passed the Federal 
Arbitration Act. 
 
The problems Congress faced were . . . twofold: the old common law hostility toward 
arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.  To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to be 
enforced in federal courts would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a 
broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the large problems Congress was 
addressing. 
 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). 
2
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on the changes that have been made to the process because of this spotlight, 
as civil and common law attorneys compete to control it. 
Part II hones in on the criticism that the features of arbitration which 
made it popular are now hindering the process, looking to the causes of this 
rapid deterioration.  The author analyzes three attributed reasons for this 
decline: Americanization, nationalization, and overregulation. 
Part III concentrates on mediation as the new, up-and-coming possible 
replacement for arbitration.  This section compares the advantages of 
mediation and arbitration and comments on the import of these differences, 
concluding that neither is poised to supplant the other, but rather that each 
should be valued for its respective purposes and in the appropriate situations. 
PART I 
A. International Commercial Arbitration:7 The Beginning 
The demise of Greek society is attributed to many causes, but one that 
has fallen by the wayside is the inability to draft compelling contracts.8  To 
prevent the onslaught of war—the ancient equivalent to litigation—clauses 
were included in contracts between city-states which stated the obligation to 
seek an alternative remedy for any disputes.9  One example is the Pease of 
Nicias between Sparta and Athens, which required that “if there should arise 
a difference between them they will remit its solution to a procedure 
according to a method upon which they will come to an agreement.”10  Any 
first-year contracts student, however, could identify the vague, nonspecific 
language as the literally fatal flaw; once an issue develops between parties, it 
is unlikely that they will agree to anything, much less a specific method of 
dispute resolution.  Thus, the establishment of a solution before the problem 
arises is the more prudent course.  The outcome of this early recorded 
 
 7. “Arbitration is customarily defined as ‘a simple proceeding voluntarily chosen by parties 
who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of their own mutual selection, whose decision, 
based on the merits of the case, they agree in advance to accept as final and binding.’”  Maureen A. 
Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional Arbitration , 88 
MINN. L. REV. 449, 452 (2004) (quoting MARLIN M. VOLZ & EDWARD P. GOGGIN, ELKOURI & 
ELKOURI: HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (5th ed. 1997).). 
 8. William K. Slate II, International Arbitration: Do Institutions Make a Difference?, 31 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41, 42 (1996). 
 9. Id. at 41. 
 10. Id. 
3
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arbitration attempt was six short years of peace before the arrangement was 
broken.11 
Perhaps realizing the potentially catastrophic effect of a poorly-written 
agreement, the English took a more successful stab at an alternative to 
litigation in the thirteenth century with their establishment of private 
tribunals to govern commercial claims,12 beginning the first western dispute 
resolution systems.  Following this cue, the Jay Treaty, created in 1794, 
contained a commission for similar tribunals to allow British creditors to 
arbitrate claims against nationals of the United States.13  Arbitration was 
finally recognized as a legitimate system with the opening of the 
International Court of Arbitration, operated by the International Chamber of 
Commerce, in 1923.14  Its value was established in the 1950s15 when 
international litigation proved to be insufficient for the newly globalized 
economy,16 and the practice gained worldwide notoriety with the 
summoning of the Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards.17  The “New York Convention,”18 as the 
conference is fondly called, made unprecedented headway with the melding 
of foreign legal systems by holding party states responsible for enforcing 
arbitral awards rendered in other countries19 and for upholding forum 
selection clauses,20 a respect that is not even afforded to court judgments.21 
 
 11. Id. at 42. 
 12. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1343. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1343-44.  “When crafting arbitration agreements in the early to mid-20th century, 
commercial parties and their respective counsel focused on two main issues: (1) the neutrality of the 
arbitration seat and (2) the seat’s local laws affecting arbitral proceedings.”  Jacobs & Paulson, supra 
note 5, at 366. 
 15. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1344. 
 16. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 362. 
 17. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1344. 
 18. The New York Convention was drafted based on the Geneva Convention of 1927, “which 
was the primary arbitration convention in force at that time.”  Brette L. Steele, Enforcing 
International Commercial Mediation Agreements as Arbitral Awards Under the New York 
Convention, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1385, 1392 (2007).  Under its terms, this early agreement required 
that a party seeking enforcement of an arbitral award had the burden of proving the finality and 
viability of the award.  Id.  The New York Convention revolutionized this harsh requirement to open 
the doors to international favor of arbitration, “plac[ing] the burden of proving these exceptions on 
the party seeking to block enforcement, instead of the party defending enforcement.  This marked 
shift in presumption illustrates and enhances a strong policy towards recognizing and enforcing 
arbitration awards.”  Id. at 1393. 
 19. As sovereign entities, states generally expect deference to their choice of domestic 
arbitration laws.  However, 
 
[s]tates which recognise international arbitration as a valid method of resolving 
commercial and other disputes are usually ready to give their assistance to the arbitral 
4
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Since the New York Convention, 146 countries have agreed to uphold 
the newfound sanctity of arbitration.22  Many of these nations have initiated 
private arbitration legislation to preserve the process domestically and 
prevent court interference with the implementation and outcomes of 
contractual arbitration clauses.23  As a result, “arbitration has become . . . 
preferred over judicial methods of dispute resolution because the parties 
have considerable freedom and flexibility with regard to choice of 
arbitrators, location of arbitration, procedural rules for the arbitration, and 
the substantive law that will govern the relationship and rights of the 
parties.”24  Parties look to arbitration for the perceived benefits of “cost 
savings, shorter resolution times, a more satisfactory process, expert 
decision makers, privacy and confidentiality, and relative finality.”25  This 
dispute resolution technique, however, is increasingly coming under fire for 
the same insufficiencies it was designed to solve.26 
 
process. . . .  In return, it is to be expected that they will seek to exercise some control 
over the arbitral process.  Such control is usually exercised on a territorial basis-first, over 
arbitrations conducted in the territory of the State concerned, and secondly, over awards 
brought into the territory of the State concerned for the purpose of recognition and 
enforcement. 
 
NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 69 (5th ed. 
2009). 
 20. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 363. 
 21. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1345.  See also Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration 
Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. Lawyers to Blame?, 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 52 (2010) (“[The New York 
Convention] has been an enormously successful international agreement . . . but it requires countries 
to do more for arbitrations than for foreign court judgments.  The New York Convention is the 
engine that makes international arbitration go.” (quoting Mark W. Friedman, a partner in the New 
York City office of Debevoise & Plimpton)). 
 22. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 363; Cf. New York Convention Countries, NEW YORK 
ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention-countries 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 23. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 363. 
 24. Id. (quoting Mark A. Buchanan, Public Policy and International Commercial Arbitration, 
26 AM. BUS. L.J. 511, 512 (1988)). 
 25. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 4. 
 26. Id. at 5 (“[T]he literature frequently focuses on various perceived shortcomings, including 
unqualified arbitrators, uneven administration, difficulties with arbitrator compromise, and limited 
appeal.  There are, moreover, frequent complaints regarding delay and high cost.”). 
5
Wagner: The Perfect Circle: Arbitration's Favors Become Its Flaws in an E
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 164 
B. Evolution of Arbitration Procedures 
Since its more modern beginnings, the benefits of arbitration have been 
tailored to apply to many situations, which has resulted in a change of the 
general process itself as it is administered in all cases.27  Two of the key 
areas which have been affected are discovery and witness examination,28 
which ultimately reflect the different and changing styles of American and 
foreign attorneys. 
Modern international commercial arbitration has its roots in Western 
Europe, primarily France and Switzerland,29 though its history comes from 
several parts of the Western World.  Now, as an internationally renowned 
system, arbitration is utilized and adopted by numerous legal styles and 
traditions.30  Because of these differences, however, there has been a residual 
clash between civil law practiced by the “Continent,” or continental Europe, 
and common law as championed by the United States and the United 
Kingdom31 since the practice was expanded globally.32  The term of art for 
this clash has been dubbed “Americanization,”33 because as international 
arbitration was “originally a European/civil law phenomenon,”34 any 
changes made are associated with America or common law.35 
 
 27. Id. at 11. 
 28. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363-67. 
 29. Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized,” or 
Harmonized?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35, 45 (2003). 
 30. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363. 
 31. Id. at 1362. 
 32. Helmer, supra note 30, at 35. 
 
[A]n ‘academic confrontation . . . between those trained in the Anglo-Saxon legal 
profession and those having a Roman law orientation’ continues to produce debates in 
scholarly writings and at conferences as to how international commercial arbitrations are 
to be conducted and what is the role of Anglo-American lawyers in the development of 
international arbitration in general. 
 
Id. 
 33. Id.  The word was supposedly coined by Stephen Bond, then Secretary General of the 
International Court of Arbitration, established by the International Chamber of Commerce.  Id. 
 34. Id. at 36. 
 35. Depending on the legal perspective of the discussion of “Americanization,” the speaker 
may describe the phenomenon in one of two ways.  First, it could mean “converting European 
arbitrators to the ‘English language and to the usages of Anglo-Americans . . ., enlarg[ing] the club 
[of European arbitrators] and . . . rationaliz[ing] the practice of arbitration such that it could become 
offshore-U.S.-style-litigation.’”  To the opposition, however, it would take on the meaning that 
“‘Americanization’ or an ‘American approach’ . . . is often a code word for an unbridled and 
ungentlemanly aggressivity [sic] and excess in arbitration.  It can involve a strategy of ‘total 
6
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1. Impact of Internationalization on Discovery 
Discovery is one of the main areas that has been affected by common 
law presence in the world of arbitration.36  Civil law discovery, called 
“disclosure,” is a process in which the attorneys from each side simply 
present to the court the main documents on which their cases are based.37  
Europe finds this simplicity to be a point of pride because it makes 
adjudication faster, cheaper, and more confidential.38  With the increasing 
involvement of American attorneys, however, representing both American 
and foreign clients in the international arena,39 the civil law tradition has 
been giving way to “mass discovery routines of American-style litigation”40 
because of the perception that disclosure does not allow for a full finding of 
the facts relevant to the case.41 
 
warfare,’ the excesses of U.S.-style discovery, and distended briefs and document submissions.”  Id. 
at 35-36. 
 36. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 80-81 (2003) (“According to a Chambers Global publication on the ‘World’s 
Leading Lawyers,’ the trend in the French legal market has been the concurrent decline of the 
traditional Franco-French firm, with its emphasis on individual superstars, and the rise of the Anglo-
American firm, with its emphasis on tight organizational structure and teamwork.  Their survey 
identifies seven of the top eight leading arbitration practices in France to be in Anglo-American law 
firms.”). 
 40. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363.  Compared to the narrow civil law requirement to 
disclose only the documents that are key to the case, the common law discovery rules, though still 
limited to an extent, appear to be quite broad. 
 
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may 
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim 
or defense–including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location 
of persons who know of any discoverable matter.  For good cause, the court may order 
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.  Relevant 
information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).  Note the difference between the burdens of the rules; civil law puts the 
burden of disclosure solely on the party in possession of the evidence, while common law parties 
have much freer rein to not only request crucial evidence, but any evidence that may or may not lead 
to crucial evidence. 
 41. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363. 
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[I]n recognizing its benefits, many civil lawyers and arbitrators have begun to accept 
limited means of discovery in international commercial arbitration.  In doing so, limited 
discovery blends the common law approach, which seeks the production of categories of 
relevant documents, and individual documents, with the civil law approach, which 
demands that the documents be identified with reasonable specificity.42 
Though this compromise was regarding procedure, which is usually not 
codified to afford the parties greater flexibility in conducting their 
arbitrations,43 the International Bar Association adopted a set of model rules 
based on this formula which could be incorporated into a contractual 
arbitration agreement.44 
Despite the more structured approach that institutional rules have been 
developing for discovery to streamline the process, many arbitrators tend “to 
be very liberal in the admission of evidence.”45  “[A]rbitrators tend to be 
reluctant to refuse admittance to evidence, and . . . tend to go along so no 
one can say that justice has not been served–so the award will be rendered 
more bulletproof.”46  Though it is rare for a court to overturn arbitrators for 
failure to admit evidence because of the wide deference given to their 
decisions, arbitrators still have an interest in the display of judiciousness 
regardless of financial or temporal expense to the arbitrating parties.47  
While this may be an inherent frustration to some parties, others recognize 
the caution as a necessary aspect of a thorough, satisfactory arbitration.48  It 
is important, therefore, in assessing the costs and benefits of arbitration to 
consider the unique situation of each party and to recognize that a costly 
inconvenience for some parties may be worth the price.49 
2. Impact of Internationalization on Witness Examination 
The other key difference between civil and common law practices lies 
with the examination of witnesses.50  Because international commercial 
arbitration turns primarily on the interpretation of business contracts, 
 
 42. Id. at 1364. 
 43. Helmer, supra note 30, at 55. 
 44. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1364-65. 
 45. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 15. 
 46. Id. (quoting Telephone Interview by Thomas J. Stipanowich with David McLean, 
Managing Partner, New Jersey Office, Latham &Watkins LLP (Oct. 7, 2008)). 
 47. Interview with Thomas J. Stipanowich, William H. Webster Chair in Dispute Resolution 
and Professor of Law at Pepperdine Univ. Sch. of Law, in Malibu, Cal. (Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter 
Stipanowich Interview]. 
 48. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 
7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. LAW J. 384, 385-86 (2009). 
 49. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48. 
 50. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1363. 
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arbitrators tend to focus more on written documents than oral testimony.51  
Civil law traditionally also tends to favor written over oral testimony, and 
thus, the preference was originally adopted in the development of 
international arbitration.52  This is not to say, though, that common law 
procedure did not have an impact.  “Attorneys with civil law backgrounds 
have come to recognize that examining witnesses, especially through cross-
examination, has many benefits.”53  This realization, like that of the benefits 
of the discovery process, is not codified in any rules to regulate proceedings 
in the interest of maintaining the flexibility of arbitration, but the arbitrators 
are given the discretion to limit the scope of examination and cross-
examination.54  They also tend to participate more heavily in the cross-
examination process than a typical common law judge to ensure that the 
information they receive is complete and accurate.55  To further ensure that 
the memorialized record is as useful as possible, condensed summaries of 
witness testimony are prepared to “promote certainty and common 
understanding in the witnesses’ testimony by reconciling inconsistencies and 
adding to the quality of the arbitrator’s decision-making.”56 
C. Common Law Infiltration Into Civil Law Arbitration 
“Americanization” is a topic that has been much discussed for over a 
decade as the United States has become a more looming presence in 
international commercial arbitration after the ratification of the New York 
Convention in 1970.57  Most notable is the effect that the presence of 
American attorneys on the international scene has had on procedure, as 
noted by the differences in discovery and examination of witnesses; “the 
continuing flow of American newcomers” brings trial tactics that are 
familiar to common law practitioners58 but overly aggressive to civil 
 
 51. Id. at 1366. 
 52. Id. at 1362. 
 53. Id. at 1366. 
 54. Id. at 1367. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Helmer, supra note 30, at 43. 
 58. Id. at 46.  See also Alford, supra note 40, at 83 (“Whether the skills are transferable or 
successful in international arbitration is not the point.  With the overwhelming influence of 
American law firms on the global scene, the fact that these tactics are tried is altering the atmosphere 
of international commercial arbitration.”). 
9
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practitioners.59  To understand the course of the changes that American law 
is encouraging in international commercial arbitration, it is important to 
trace why there are differences between civil and common law,60 and from 
where they stem.  The underlying justification for legal procedures and 
practices appears to generally flow from the social ethics on which they are 
based.  Thus, a comparison of the doctrinal ethics of civil and common law 
should shed some light on the foundation for each system’s procedures and 
be illustrative of where their principles diverge. 
1. Civil vs. Common Law Ethics 
American law students are indoctrinated with the ethical model standard 
of “zealous advocacy,” which is touted as the quintessential behavior for a 
practicing attorney.61  With this high bar in mind, aspiring young graduates 
apply this requirement to every aspect of legal practice, and to perform any 
lesser standard reeks of potential malpractice allegations.62  As a result of 
this mantra, “[c]ommon law lawyers . . . often[ ]demonstrate[ ] greater 
energy and training in obtaining, analyzing[,] and arguing the facts on which 
most arbitrations are won or lost.”63  Considering this assessment by a Swiss 
attorney, it seems to be no mystery why European practitioners would be 
resentful of the strong litigation techniques exemplified by American 
lawyers that so often tip the outcome of a case in their favor.64 
By contrast, civil law systems have no such archetypal standard to 
which their attorneys feel morally and professionally bound.65  “[T]he rules 
of professional conduct ‘are handed down from generation to generation as 
some kind of “oral law,” uncodified and restricted to prohibitions of the 
obvious conflicts of interest.’”66  Some jurisdictions do not have set 
guidelines at all, but rather rely on volunteer organizations to develop a code 
for the noble-minded that has only force of conscience.67  Far from 
 
 59. Helmer, supra note 30, at 35-36. 
 60. Id. at 36-37 (“The whole debate of Americanization of international commercial 
arbitration springs from what has been called the ‘Common Law-Civil Law Divide.’”). 
 61. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 11. 
 62. Id. at 12. 
 63. Helmer, supra note 30, at 47 (quoting Nicolas C. Ulmer, A Comment on “The 
‘Americanization’ of International Arbitration?,” 16 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 24, 24 (2001)). 
 64. Helmer, supra note 30, at 47. 
 65. See Mary C. Daly, What Every Lawyer Needs to Know About the Civil Law System, 1998 
PROF. LAW. SYMP. ISSUES 37, 46 (1998). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  See Rona R. Mears, Ethics and Due Diligence: A Lawyer’s Perspective on Doing 
Business with Mexico, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 605, 609-11 (1991). 
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lamenting the lack of ethical guidance, British practitioners, who follow the 
same undefined principles as civil law attorneys, “th[ink] it quaint that 
American lawyers fe[el] in need of legal rules for their governance, but they 
recall[ ] that Americans seem[ ] to need legal rules for everything.”68 
While the import of these ethical differences may not be immediately 
apparent, it does explain the impetus behind the techniques utilized by 
common and civil law practitioners.  Common law practitioners are more 
likely to feel professionally obligated to engage in litigious techniques that 
meet the standard of “zealous advocacy,” even in the context of arbitration, 
because they are compelled to do so on behalf of their clients.69  Civil law 
practitioners, on the other hand, have the freedom to adapt their techniques 
to what they believe is appropriate for the situation as there is no firm 
standard of performance to which they will be held accountable.70  This 
conclusion suggests that the aggression of American law that is so loathed 
by civil law practitioners is unlikely to subside unless the ethical standards 
ingrained in the minds of American law students are amended to provide for 
differences between litigious and dispute resolution situations.71 
 
 68. Daly, supra note 66, at 46 n.29. 
 69. See Stipanowich Interview, supra note 47.  It is important to keep in mind that the ethical 
obligations of attorneys in an arbitration are not equated to the rules of litigation; zealous advocacy 
does not require the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure scope of discovery to be applied to the 
resolution of every dispute.  Id.  Rather, a client may want or be willing to have less discovery, in 
which case zealous advocacy would mean finding the fastest and cheapest solution.  Id.  After all, in 
the words of William Gladstone, “justice delayed is justice denied.”  Id.  Discovery as practiced in 
litigation has essentially been priced out of the market to the point of impracticality and does not 
need to be brought to arbitration for a lawyer to meet the standard of ethics.  Id.  See also THE 
COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: KEY ACTION STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL, ARBITRATORS & 
ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS 26 (Thomas J. Stipanowich ed., 2010) [hereinafter 
PROTOCOLS]. 
 70. See Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to 
Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 99-100 (2005) [hereinafter Regulating 
Arbitrators]. 
 
[C]ivilian attorneys are assigned an obligation to be ‘independent’ from their clients.  In 
this role, civilian attorneys do not present their clients’ positions in their strongest, most 
uncompromising form . . . .  Instead, they mediate their strongest position, presenting a 
pre-screened and more restrained view of their clients’ cases to the inquisitorial judge. 
 
Id.  Accordingly, civil law judges do not interpret the applicable codes and statutes, but rather simply 
apply the law for the correct outcome.  Id. at 100. 
 71. Because of the increasing formalities associated with arbitration and its supposed likeness 
to litigation, 
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2. Ethical Differences Applied to Arbitration 
Though arbitrators are touted essentially as neutral magistrates in the 
disputes over which they preside, it would be foolish to pretend that they are 
immune to the influences of their national countries.72  While this may not 
be as crucial with the application of procedural rules such as scope of 
discovery and format of examination, ethical considerations pervade into 
every aspect of any legal proceeding.73  However, in order to unify the 
ethical values of international arbitrators, any standards that are developed 
“must be linked to the values of the international arbitration system and the 
procedures that reflect those values.”74  Because international arbitration is 
“the only viable means for resolving international business disputes,” the 
necessary inclination toward increased predictability and accountability must 
be achieved, but only as governed by a set of ethical standards to which 
arbitrators can be held accountable.75 
 
 
[t]he zealous advocate who jealously guards (and does not share) information, who does 
not reveal adverse facts (and in some cases, adverse law) to the other side, who seeks to 
maximize gain for his client, may be successful in arbitrations and some forms of mini-
trials and summary jury trials. 
However, the zealous advocate will likely prove a failure in mediation, where creativity, 
focus on the opposing sides’ interests, and a broadening, not narrowing of issues, may be 
more valued skills. 
 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the 
Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 407, 427 (1997). 
 72. See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct 
for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341, 376 (2002) (“In the absence of articulated 
norms and express enforcement mechanisms, arbitrators likely assess the conduct of attorneys based 
on private–and untested–standards informed by the arbitrators’ legal and cultural backgrounds.”).  
Therefore, it is impractical to expect ethical norms to “effectively be resolved on an ad hoc basis 
during proceedings.”  Id. at 377. 
 73. The different roles that the various legal systems contemplate for attorneys 
 
reflect the larger cultural values of the societies that produce them. . . . [T]he greater 
authority of civil law judges reflects . . . a greater acceptance of authority and less 
tolerance for uncertainty. . . .  [T]he expanded control of parties in U.S. proceedings, and 
the consequent role of the U.S. attorney as strategist and lobbyist, are said to be linked to 
the American commitment to individualism and an exaltation of due process over 
efficiency and even fact-finding accuracy.  Thus, while legal ethics are often regarded as 
universal by virtue of their intimate relationship to moral philosophy, they are in fact 
vitally linked to the cultural values of the systems that produced them. 
 
Id. at 394. 
 74. Id. at 395. 
 75. Id. at 422. 
12
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/5
[Vol. 12: 159, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
171 
Arbitrators are equated to judges because of the significant control that 
they have over parties in contractual, statutory, and other legal capacities76 
despite the fact that there are no formal minimum qualifications, including 
the possession of legal training.77  Regardless of this questionable disparity, 
there is little that parties can do legally in the event of arbitrator misconduct 
because of the confidentiality78 of the process.79  Additionally, “arbitration 
associations ‘have an economic disincentive to enforcing their codes of 
ethics.  There is an inherent conflict of interest for arbitration associations: 
they must enforce codes of ethics enough to preserve the good name of 
arbitration, but not so much that they generate unwanted publicity and 
lawsuits.’”80  This financially-motivated conundrum is mirrored for the 
arbitrator as well, who must determine whether there is an ethical need to 
disclose conflicts of interests81 which may result in dismissal from the case.82 
 
 76. Weston, supra note 8, at 452.  Arbitrators even have the inherent power to determine their 
own jurisdiction under the doctrine of competence.  NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 20, at 347.  
The decision made regarding this authority is given wide deference and only results in a reversal “in 
very unusual circumstances.”  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).  See 
also PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 (2003) (“questions whether [the 
contractual provisions] render the parties’ agreements unenforceable and whether it is for courts or 
arbitrators to decide enforceability . . . the proper course is to compel arbitration.”).  
 77. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 56. 
 78. Sometimes the process can be too confidential when the parties request, but do not receive, 
an explanation for the award. 
 
An arbitrator should be free to decide the dispute before him without fear that he will 
have to explain the basis for his decision, and how he arrived at it, at some later date.  If 
the parties to an arbitration agreement want to know the arbitrator’s reasoning, they may 
request that he include it in his award . . . .  Once an arbitrator issues an award, however, 
his role is complete and, like a judge or jury, he may not be required to answer questions 
about why he reached a particular result. 
 
Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 68 (2nd Cir. 2003) (overruled on other grounds).  What the 
court does not mention is that unlike a judge or jury, an arbitrator is hired by the parties, and it would 
seem that it would be within their rights to demand his full services for their payment, at least to the 
extent of a written opinion. 
 79. Weston, supra note 8, at 463-64.  Because of the confidential aspect of arbitration, there 
are also “no guarantees of due process, discovery, appeal, or other protections that are available in 
the judicial system.”  Id. 
 80. Id. at 469. 
 81. Interestingly, one of the biggest key differences between civil and common law lies with 
conflicts of interest. 
 
American attorneys brought . . . practices that profoundly affect arbitrator conduct, such 
as a compulsively persnickety approach to conflicts-of-interest. . . . [T]he reality and 
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Thus, it has been firmly established that it is necessary to have a system 
of ethics to which international arbitrators would be obligated.83  The 
process of creating such a system appears to be rather simple; “relatively 
few direct conflicts appear to exist among national codes of professional 
conduct.”84  While the biggest differences appear in the approaches to ethics 
in civil and common law jurisdictions,85 even these are deemed to be 
 
perception of U.S. conflict-of-interest standards contrast sharply with European standards 
and practices, which permit the same and other close relationships to be legitimately 
withheld. 
 
Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 63.  In his article, Alan Rau suggests that the current lack 
of set ethical obligations leans too far toward the civil law approach: 
 
[A]ll of the arbitrators on international panels are expected to be both impartial and 
independent of the party appointing them.  They may, however—without violating in any 
way this theoretical obligation—quite acceptably share the nationality, or political or 
economic philosophy, or “legal culture” of the nominating party—and may therefore be 
supposed from the very beginning to be “sympathetic” to that party’s contentions or 
“favorably disposed” to its position. 
 
Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L L. J. 
449, 459 (2005).  This assessment, however, is insultingly narrow-minded in its assumption that 
simple commonality of ideology will lead to discriminatory behavior.  While ADR was once 
practiced with the attitude that “anyone who would engage in ADR must of necessity be a moral, 
good, creative, and of course, ethical person,” the pendulum does not need to swing so far the other 
direction that any familiarity with a party’s background will warrant disqualification.  Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 71, at 408. 
 82. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 71-72. 
 83. See Cyrus Benson, Can Professional Ethics Wait?  The Need for Transparency in 
International Arbitration, 3 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 78, 78-79 (2009).  A failure to develop a universal 
code of arbitral ethics 
 
can easily breed procedural unfairness in the particular case, and it matters generally 
because it attacks the integrity of the system of international arbitration.  [Without 
practical guidance for counsel,] [t]he system of self-policing may become impossible and 
there may be a gradual deterioration in the standards of legal professional conduct.  The 
international arbitral process would then be brought into disrepute and, once its good 
reputation was lost, it could take decades to rebuild confidence. 
 
Id.  See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71, at 418 (“ADR now needs ‘ethics’ or standards in part 
because of its successes—it is being challenged from within as well as without.”). 
 84. Benson, supra note 83, at 82. 
 85. Id. 
 
Most common law codes of professional conduct are far more detailed in identifying 
conduct to be regulated than their civil law counterparts, where lawyer conduct is 
governed by general standards of integrity and good faith.  Further, common law systems 
of ethics incorporate a lawyer’s duty to the tribunal or court, in addition to that owed to 
the client.  This duty is largely unrecognised in civil law systems. 
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unlikely to affect the arbitrators “in aspects that are most relevant to their 
ethical obligations.”86  Therefore, the most widely-advocated method for 
cultivating a system of international arbitration ethical standards is to specify 
broad standards – “based on adherence to ethical, moral, and ‘good’ non-
adversary principles” – that are supplemented by the principles of common 
law which guide ethical legal processes.87 
From these standards, several codes could be developed which parties 
would be able to adopt and adapt to their situations in the true spirit of 
arbitration.88  Theoretically, the greater discretion of the parties in governing 
the conduct of the arbitrators would warrant greater involvement by the 
institutions, which would hopefully increase the transparency of how the 
institutions are run and correct the market’s perception of them.89  While this 
increased transparency would not necessarily guarantee more ethical 
arbitrators or outcomes, it could enhance the legitimacy of institutional 
arbitration, which depends on the appearance of impartiality on the part of 
the neutrals.90  Thus, the harmonization of civil and common law traditions 
in procedural arbitral practices should be applied to the ethical standards as 
well to create a reliable framework to which arbitrators would be held 
accountable. 
PART II 
A. Arbitration’s Full Circle 
Tracing the path of the evolution of arbitration and investigating the 




 86. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 109. 
 87. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71, at 451.  For an example of such a set of standards, see 
Benson, supra note 83, at 88-94. 
 88. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 111.  While parties already have the flexibility to 
create and implement codes of ethics on arbitrators in their agreements to arbitrate, the idea would 
be to give extra incentive to do so by making available templates to incorporate.  Id. at 112.  Though 
not discussed by the author, the effectiveness of this new system would rely on the responsibility of 
the parties’ attorneys in choosing the applicable code—a level of responsibility that has not always 
been demonstrated in the world of international arbitration. 
 89. Id. at 111-12. 
 90. Id. at 118-20. 
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to go and what its fate may be.  When it was widely introduced as a viable 
alternative to litigation in the early 1900s, advocates lauded arbitration’s key 
characteristics—efficiency,91 lower expense, and finality92—as a perfect 
escape.  Their tune soon changed however to denounce the process for the 
same shortcomings from which litigation suffered: “‘judicializ[ation],’ 
formal[ity], cost[ ], and time-consum[ption].”93  If this condemning view is 
accurate, arbitration may be subject to the same backseat position to which it 
assigned litigation when it rose to the international spotlight as an effective 
dispute resolution alternative. 
Arbitration was implemented globally with little critique for the first 
century of its prominence; numerous institutions were established to 
promote its powers, many of which saw significant growth.94  There is no 
question of its success, and at one time, as much as ninety percent of 
international commercial transactions contained arbitration clauses.95  
Arbitration is accepted as an indispensable alternative to litigation and is still 
much preferred in the international arena despite some concerns about its 
rules and prominent fora; its value is particularly known to those who have 
experienced it.96  However, disapproval of arbitration techniques is now 
rampant, citing several causes including heavy American influence, 
nationalization, and overregulation. 
1. American Litigation: Bettering International Commercial 
Arbitration? 
The most blatant attempt to blame American influence for the 
deterioration of arbitration comes from foreign litigators associating it with 
“judicialization.”97  American attorneys are often charged with trying to 
make arbitration procedures mirror those of the U.S. court system “in order 
to increase its predictability, reliability, and equity.”98  The result however is 
 
 91. Though the Federal Arbitration Act came long after the introduction of arbitration, it has 
actually begun to undermine the efficiency of the process it was designed to promote.  Dean Witters 
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (“The preeminent concern of Congress in passing 
the Act was to enforce private agreements into which the parties had entered, and that concern 
requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is ‘piecemeal’ litigation 
. . . .”). 
 92. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 8. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Stromberg, supra note 6, at 1351-52. 
 95. Id. at 1342-43. 
 96. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48. 
 97. Helmer, supra note 30, at 36. 
 98. Id. 
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said to be that those procedural changes convert arbitration into U.S.-style 
litigation.99  The implication that Americans becoming involved in 
international commercial arbitration is the sole cause of its downfall seems 
to be a bit far-fetched.  For instance, despite the fact that the process began 
in Western Europe, the application of American procedures in stages such as 
discovery and witness examination has had a lasting impact on arbitration 
itself.100  Simply because international commercial arbitration is no longer 
exclusively governed by civil law does not mean that it will automatically 
suffer the same fate as the system—American litigation—which has 
influenced it.  Regardless of the truth of this conclusion, civil law systems 
still insist on circumventing the influence of American techniques, namely 
by exercising greater control over the substantive arbitral process through 
increasingly detailed contract clauses.101 
Further, a certain amount of American influence in almost any industry 
should be expected per past global trends.102  One author has cited as many 
as nine key trends initiated by contact with American litigation styles, none 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. See supra nn. 41 & 52 (indicating the willingness of civil law attorneys to incorporate 
American methods of discovery and examination into arbitration procedures). 
 101. Rau, supra note 81, at 453-54. 
 
In substantial transactions one is increasingly seeing a use of custom-tailored arbitration 
clauses—often intended to diminish the finality of awards or to increase formality in 
arbitral procedure.  This is surely but one manifestation of what is often described and 
decried as the “judicialization” or “legalization” or arbitration . . . .  The increased 
involvement . . . of American litigators in transnational arbitration also undoubtedly plays 
a role; the habits—and perceived duties—of such litigators may, it is said, lead them “to 
push to enlarge the limited means of appeal and therefore expand the control of the courts 
over private justice.” 
 
Id. 
 102. Alford, supra note 40, at 87-88.  Alford draws an analogy to the film industry to imply that 
American involvement in up-and-coming ideas is inevitable: 
 
[C]inema was born in Paris on December 28, 1895 . . . .  Much of the early history of film 
has its roots in Europe rather than the United States.  The greatest films were German, the 
best editing techniques were Russian, and much of the best equipment was developed in 
France.  But it was the establishment in the 1920s of major Hollywood motion picture 
studios . . . that led to the golden age of Hollywood.  Those studios created an economic 
juggernaut that assimilated the best and the brightest artists and directors from Europe . . . 
.  Today we all know that the United States is the dominant force in film. 
 
Id.  And so the same can be true for America’s influence in international commercial arbitration.  
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of which can take credit for arbitration’s potentially deteriorating success.103  
Rather, a different global trend triggered by the increasingly interconnected 
economies of various nations should be examined – nationalization.104 
2. The Effects of the Natural Nationalization Process 
Nationalization “is part of a privatization-nationalization cycle found in 
many places throughout the world.”105  It is instigated by a host of effects, 
including “political ideology, foreign relations, decapitalization of the host 
country, a desire for increased control and independence, market 
domination, culture, and even religion.”106 
The rise of government control over once-private industries began with 
the growth of fossil fuel use to produce energy; the spike in demand 
necessitated more resources to meet these quotas, which could only be 
supplied by the government.107  At first, the supplying countries only 
required larger shares of the profits of oil-producing companies, but it was 
simply a matter of time before the governments “increase[d] their roles in 
the management of the oil companies’ ventures.”108  Because the countries 
themselves now owned such lucrative international industries, any disputes 
that arose came between their governments.109 
Though relations between countries have come a long way since the 
Pease of Nicias,110 resolving international disputes is still far from perfect.  
With politics involved with international commercial issues, the number of 
claims has skyrocketed, as has the amount of money associated with them111 
as the heads of states are perceived to be easier targets, and are connected 
with far more potential parties through various contractual obligations and 
bilateral investment treaties.112  While some countries have responded more 
aggressively than others,113 challenging the validity of their own contracts to 
 
 103. Alford, supra note 40.  Alford lists the following influences: rise of Anglo-American law 
firms, legal training, style, discovery, choice of law, venue, published precedent, language, and 
institutional personnel.  Id. 
 104. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 375. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 375-76. 
 108. Id. at 376. 
 109. Id. at 381-85. 
 110. Slate, supra note 9, at 41-42. 
 111. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 384. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Argentina was inundated with requests for arbitration after its 2001 economic crisis “that 
led to its defaulting on foreign debt and the devaluation of the peso.”  Id. 
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prevent liability, there is no question that the myriad of defense strategies 
such as expropriation and breach of contract will result in arbitration 
becoming “more complicated, more costly, and less efficient.”114  If this 
assertion sounds familiar, it is; it is the same claim that scholars have made 
about the effect of Americanization on arbitration.115 
There are two main procedural solutions that have been proposed by 
those who express concern with this trend: better delineation of legal 
principles that could lead to preliminary determinations; and more efficient 
techniques for discovery and disclosure tactics.116  First, with the flood of 
claims that have been brought against the governments of countries who 
have nationalized prominent producers of crucial resources, it is highly 
unlikely that they are all meritorious.117  American litigation disposes of 
frivolous claims through summary judgments and other preliminary 
procedures; however, “[o]ne disadvantage of international arbitration is that 
issues that may be dispositive of a case and appropriate for a motion to 
dismiss or summary judgment in court litigation may often be considered by 
arbitrators only after a full evidentiary hearing on all of the issues.”118  
Recognizing this detriment, the suggested solution has been to draft 
arbitration clauses to include specific language to provide for these 
determinations.119  Practically speaking, it would also be prudent for arbitral 
 
Argentina responded with a multi-layer legal defense strategy: it challenged [the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes]’s jurisdiction to hear the 
disputes and argued that bilateral treaties do not supersede Argentina’s constitution, 
which requires claims to be brought before Argentine courts; it proceeded to defend the 
claims on their merits and asserted the doctrine of sovereign rights and the national 
emergency clause in its [bilateral investment treaties] to justify its monetary policies; it 
scrutinized the compliance with contractual obligations by each contractor since the 
beginning of the contract and threatened termination; it challenged the validity and 
enforceability of awards, including expanded review by the Federal Supreme Court of 
Argentina. 
 
Id.  Though Argentina’s tactics are geared toward economic and global political survival, their 
effectiveness could lead to similar defenses in other countries.  This is harmful because it could draw 
out the timing and cost of arbitration, particularly with the increase of claims against the 
governments of the countries involved. 
 114. Id. at 385. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 386. 
 117. Id. at 384. 
 118. Id. at 397. 
 119. Id. at 398. 
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institutions to consider such changes to their procedures to encourage the 
practice more widely in contracts that employ their rules.120 
Second, the process of arbitral discovery has fallen victim to the 
cumbersome use of expert witnesses, who may or may not contribute any 
meaningful information to the cases.121  Even the most contributive experts 
impose extra costs and time on the parties to the conflict, and because of 
their lack of neutrality, detract from the spirit of the arbitration process.122  
Because education of the arbitrators on the central issues of the case is 
necessary, it not practical to eliminate the role of experts entirely; rather, the 
proposed remedy has been to increase the transparency of their technical 
conclusions, and to request that they simply submit their findings with the 
result to enhance the efficiency of the examination and cross-examination 
stage.123 
3. Overregulation: Taking Too Much Control from the Parties 
Finally, while arbitration is often paraded as a model procedure that 
maintains flexibility of process124 and provides a solution, the increase in 
arbitral institution regulation is beginning to defeat that assertion.  The clash 
between the origins of international commercial arbitration in civil law and 
the rising influence of American and British common law125 has necessitated 
 
 120. Currently, the International Bar Association only has a vague reference to preliminary 
rulings on the issues in its Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration: 
“[E]ach Arbitral Tribunal is encouraged to identify to the Parties, as soon as it considers it to be 
appropriate, the issues that it may regard as relevant to the outcome of the case, including issues 
where a preliminary determination may be appropriate.”  Id. at 397 (quoting IBA Rules on the 
Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration pmbl. 3 (1999)). 
 121. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 5, at 398. 
 122. Id. at 399.  American litigation has come to refer fondly to this head butt of professional, 
qualified witnesses as “battle of the experts,” which has led to significant debate over who exactly 
falls within the description of “expert” and when their testimony is considered valid.  
 123. Id.  “[A]dditional mandatory disclosures would promote greater neutrality, transparency, 
and objectivity . . . .”  Id. 
 
Those additional mandatory disclosures, which would be established early in the 
arbitration process, should include: the expert’s entire file including draft reports, 
correspondence, data, documents, and notes used in the evaluation of the issues within his 
or her expertise; a list of proceedings and cases in which the expert has provided 
testimony in the previous five years; and if the expert’s work includes any sampling or 
testing, then the expert and party must take duplicative samples and timely provide them 
to the opposing party and submit the results of all samples and tests. 
 
Id. 
 124. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 1. 
 125. See supra note 60. 
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a litany of rules and treaties to ensure that arbitration maintains its 
effectiveness.126  In order for the rules themselves to maintain neutrality, 
they do not reflect the legal customs or systems of the countries that provide 
them, ideally to afford the greatest possible flexibility for arbitrators.127  
While this is helpful in conducting the actual arbitration, the disparities 
amongst the various possibilities have created problems in enforcing the 
awards and how each country is to treat the credibility of the arbitration 
award.128  The goal of the New York Convention was to address these 
problems, but differences in the interpretation of the Convention language 
have lessened the effect of this treaty.129 
While the purpose of the New York Convention was to ensure the 
finality of arbitral awards and protect them from the uncertainty of judicial 
review, this end is ironically contrary to the ultimate idea of arbitration as a 
flexible institution.  Not every party that embarks on alternate dispute 
resolution is seeking finality or an absolute avoidance of the courtroom.130  
Some users of arbitration wish to retain the option of a second opinion in the 
event that they feel the outcome is unfair, but have no grounds on which to 
overturn it; in this case, they would incorporate a judicial review 
provision.131  This tool allows parties to explore the flexibility of dictating 
the arbitration proceedings through the language of their contract without 
committing to the finality that is usually so integral to the process.132  
 
 126. See Stromberg, supra note 6, 1352-58.  There are several global arbitral institutions that 
have developed model sets of rules for parties to incorporate into arbitration clauses, including: 
International Chamber of Commerce, American Arbitration Association, London Court of 
International Arbitration, China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, and 
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre.  Id. 
 127. Helmer, supra note 30, at 55. 
 128. Kenneth F. Dunham, International Arbitration is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile, 2005 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 323, 343 (2005). 
 129. Id. 
 
Procedures are left to national arbitration laws, and this problem could be remedied by 
uniform procedural rules of enforcement.  There is also a need for consistency among 
nations in the application and interpretation of the convention. . . . Some nations such as 
Canada do not consider the convention as controlling over its own laws. 
 
Id. 
 130. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48. 
 131. Id. See also Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 17-18. 
 132. See Cable Connections, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1355 (2008).  The 
California Supreme Court recently confirmed that parties can agree to wider judicial review of an 
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However, the stringent requirement of the New York Convention to 
recognize arbitration awards without including the courts133 threatens to 
impede on this option.134 
An additional pitfall for the suggestion of uniform, effective arbitration 
rules comes from the fact that the arbitrator’s authority is dictated by the 
scope of the contractual language,135 allowing parties to create their own 
process.  The force and deference of arbitration clauses have improved since 
arbitration has risen to prominence, upheld even in the face of allegations of 
fraud or illegality.136  The purpose for safeguarding tailored arbitration 
clauses is to promote the freedom of parties to contract and to protect the 
agreements that they make, but for the system to be able to handle and 
process the “wide range of business disputes, including many large, complex 
cases, arbitration procedures have tended to become longer and more 
detailed.”137  Thus, the goal of providing flexibility to arbitrating parties by 
allowing them to devise their own procedures and choose their own forum 
has in fact led to stronger and more varied regulations that have taken away 
this flexibility. 
The increasingly formality and rule-oriented nature of arbitration has 
forced parties to seek alternative courses, still within arbitration but by 
navigating around the rules.  By drafting international agreements “with 
greater precision and . . . intentionally choosing what law they want to 
govern interpretation and enforcement of their agreement,” parties avoid the 
 
arbitration award through a specific provision.  Id.  This provision will ideally state the level of 
finality that the parties expect from the award, and in what circumstances it can be appealed.  Id.  “If 
the parties constrain the arbitrators’ authority by requiring a dispute to be decided according to the 
rule of law, and make plain their intention that the award is reviewable for legal error, the general 
rule of limited review has been displaced by the parties’ agreement.”  Id. 
 133. Though the California Supreme Court had the authority to uphold judicial review 
provisions in Cable Connections for state arbitrations falling under its jurisdiction, the federal courts 
incorporated the more stringent New York Convention requirements for judicial review in the 
Federal Arbitration Act.  For example, the Ninth Circuit determined that arbitrators do not “‘exceed 
their powers’ . . . when they merely interpret or apply the governing law incorrectly;” rather, there 
must be a “manifest disregard of law” or an irrational decision for the courts to even consider 
reviewing the award.  Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Services, Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 
(9th Cir. 2003).  Considering the standard that appellate courts use to review lower court decisions, 
arbitral awards tend to receive far more deference than the opinions of federal judges. 
 134. While flexibility is important to preserve arbitration as a process, judicial review 
provisions create too many difficulties for users, according to Professor Stipanowich.  Business users 
in particular should look to the grounds of vacatur in the Federal Arbitration Act for relief if 
necessary; if more options are desired, a carefully written appellate arbitration procedure can be 
adopted in the contract.  Stipanowich Interview, supra note 49.  See also PROTOCOLS, supra note 69, 
at 38-42. 
 135. Dunham, supra note 129, at 328. 
 136. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 10. 
 137. Id. at 11. 
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involvement of intervening substantive law that would otherwise fill the 
gaps.138  Still, it is unfortunate for parties to have to evade a process that was 
designed to maximize the efficiency of the resolution of their disputes 
simply because it became too entangled in its own technicalities.139 
PART III 
A. Mediation: The New Alternative to Arbitration 
Despite the mounting concern over the effectiveness and longevity of 
arbitration, it remains certain that most countries still prefer alternative 
dispute resolution processes to the rigors of litigation.140  “Many nations are 
disenchanted with litigation . . . because of the significant problems 
surrounding the recognition and enforcement of litigated judgments.  In 
addition, many nations generally mistrust the supposed neutrality of foreign 
legal systems.”141  Arbitration was a natural successor to this dying system, 
but now suffers from its own impracticalities, including, as noted, a 
perceived American influence, more centralized national governance, and 
increased arbitral institutional regulation.142  Though arbitration was once 
the favored alternative dispute resolution because of its predictable 
enforcement practices,143 for some scholars, the next logical step is to 
“‘make greater use of conciliation [mediation] as a pathway to the settlement 
 
 138. Regulating Arbitrators, supra note 70, at 66-67. 
 139. While it may seem that arbitration is essentially shooting itself in the foot with its 
overregulation, it should be noted that there are certain parties practicing arbitration who welcome 
the strict structure that has been created by the institutions.  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 71, at 
408 (“To the extent that ADR has become institutionalized and more routine, it is now practiced by 
many different people, pursuing many different goals.”). 
 140. Julie Barker, International Mediation—A Better Alternative for the Resolution of 
Commercial Disputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator Involved in an International Commercial 
Mediation with Mexicans, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1996). 
 141. Id. at 5. 
 142. In addition to the downfalls of international commercial arbitration that were the focus of 
the preceding section, some other problems that have contributed to decreasing popularity are: 
involvement of multiple national legal systems; expensive, lengthy, adversarial, adjudicative-type 
procedures; uncontrolled result; and limited appellate review.  Id. at 7. 
 143. Steele, supra note 19, at 1385. 
23
Wagner: The Perfect Circle: Arbitration's Favors Become Its Flaws in an E
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 182 
of economic and business disputes, rather than automatically taking the more 
complex arbitration route to dispute settlement.’”144 
Mediation is often viewed as a more conciliatory method by which to 
resolve a dispute145 as compared to arbitration because its key purpose is to 
facilitate an agreement between the parties146 rather than to impose one.147  
As a result, there is no guarantee of an outcome,148 but those that are forged 
are thought to be more satisfying for the parties, particularly as mediation is 
designed to address the “non-arbitrable” issues such as “intangible feelings, 
personal interests, and emotional concerns.”149  Thus, one of the most lauded 
benefits of mediation is the preservation of the business relationships in 
which the parties were engaged before the dispute arose.150 
B. Exploring the “Unique Benefits” of Mediation 
To evaluate whether mediation is truly an effective way to circumvent 
arbitration and litigation, the merits of the processes should be directly 
compared.  Three of mediation’s most boastful characteristics are: the 
potential creativity of the outcomes; the informality of the proceedings, 
leading to a faster and cheaper result; and the ability of the parties to discuss 
their positions so that they feel that their views have been considered.151  To 
assume, however, that none of these features could be achieved in arbitration 
is to ignore one of arbitration’s fundamental premises – its flexibility.  
Arbitrators can be creative with their awards so long as they do not overstep 
 
 144. Barker, supra note 140, at 8 (quoting Linda C. Reif, Conciliation as a Mechanism for the 
Resolution of International Economic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 578, 580-81 
(1990-1991)). 
 145. See Int’l Chamber of Commerce, 2009 Statistical Report, DISPUTE RESOLUTION LIBRARY 
(2009), available at http://www.iccdrl.com [hereinafter Statistical Report].  Mediation is one of the 
International Chamber of Commerce’s token ADR processes; appropriately, the ICC’s version of 
ADR stands for “Amicable Dispute Resolution,” rather than the traditional American “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution.”  Id. Perhaps most significantly, the ICC does not include arbitration in its 
classification of ADR as America includes it in its own version.  This rather telling difference 
demonstrates the global disillusionment with arbitration as a non-adversarial process, though it is 
still often perceived as such in the U.S. as compared with the vicious American litigation system. 
 146.  Id. at 10. 
 147. Mediation has been an important technique for centuries.  Abraham Lincoln used a key 
neutral tactic to learn the true interests of a slandered client in order to win her an apology and save 
the opponent from bankruptcy.  Lincoln’s Lessons, supra note 2, at 19-20. 
 148. Barker, supra note 140, at 10. 
 149. Id. at 8. 
 150. Id. at 10. 
 151. Id. at 9. 
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the bounds of their discretion.152  Additionally, as arbitration is a creature of 
contract,153 the parties have the choice of how formal the proceedings will 
be, including the possibilities of making their own presentations to the 
arbitrators to ensure that their feelings are considered. 
Other “distinct” attributes of mediation are its wide application to any 
kind of conflict and the confidentiality of the process.154  Arbitration, 
though, has never been limited to a particular type of field, and also assures 
its users of the utmost confidentiality.155  Thus, the purported advantages of 
mediation over arbitration are actually common to both processes because of 
their comparable flexibility that can be found in alternative dispute 
resolution techniques. 
While mediation shares many of its qualities with arbitration and other 
ADR processes, it still retains a personality of its own.  Its advocates tout the 
absence of a binding decision, the ability to solve deeper, relational issues, 
and increased cultural sensitivity.156  Though these may be valuable 
considerations in circumstances where the parties are willing to take the time 
 
 152. Steele, supra note 19, at 1393.  According to Article V(1) of the New York Convention, 
arbitration awards may be unenforceable if “(c) the arbitrator acted outside his authority.”  Id.  They 
may similarly be invalid if “[t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country.”  Id.  Though written in broad terms, these provisions are construed 
rather narrowly to give arbitrators broad discretion in making their awards.  Id. at 1394.  Rather, the 
most important limitation on arbitration awards that must be recognized is the scope of the 
arbitrator’s authority, delineated by the contractual terms.  See NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 
20, at 107. 
 
An arbitration agreement confers a mandate upon an arbitral tribunal to decide any and 
all of the disputes that come within the ambit of that agreement.  It is important that an 
arbitrator not go beyond this mandate.  If he does, there is a risk that his award will be 
refused recognition and enforcement under the provisions of the New York Convention.  
Article V(1)(c) provides that recognition and enforcement may be refused: “If the award 
deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the 
submission to the arbitration, or if it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of 
the submission to arbitration.” 
 
Id.  The same restriction on scope similarly applies to mediation as a fellow contractual delineation. 
 153. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48. 
 154. Barker, supra note 140, at 9. 
 155. Stipanowich, supra note 3, at 4. 
 156. See generally Barker, supra note 140.  The author discusses benefits of mediation like 
control over process and outcome, but without considering that with the control comes the obligation 
to agree on how to control these aspects to make mediation viable.  Considering the complexity of 
party interaction on the international level generally, it is questionable as to whether this approach 
would be preferable. 
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to engage in such therapeutic tactics, these practices are not appropriate in 
the international commercial setting.  Where a commercial agreement is at 
stake in today’s fast-paced business world, an assured outcome is crucial, 
which is one reason to value arbitration.157  And although it would be ideal 
to preserve a good business relationship where one exists, this is not always 
the case, making the outcome of the dispute the most important focus, not 
the parties’ personal issues; regardless, with the plethora of commercial 
options that exist globally, the time sacrificed hashing out individual 
differences is usually ill-spent.158  Finally, cultural sensitivity is very 
important on the international level, but those who wish to put mediation at 
the forefront of global ADR ignore the possibility that arbitration could 
incorporate this beneficial technique.  By encouraging arbitration institutions 
to train their arbitrators to respond to ideological differences, arbitration 
could take a page from mediation’s book in making itself a more viable 
process. 
C. The Practicality of Mediation as the New Arbitration 
Because of the early prominence of arbitration in the international field, 
it has gained more deference than mediation amongst countries that 
recognize its usefulness.  The New York Convention provides that its 
signatories uphold foreign arbitration awards without judicial review, except 
under a limited set of circumstances.159  As a result, the treaty “plays a vital 
role in the predictability of international business” because it gives a set of 
guidelines that have led the way for precedential decisions on which 
arbitrators can rely for consistency in their opinions.160  Additionally, the 
Convention only recognizes those awards that are “binding” on the parties to 
 
 157. “Even if mediation does not lead to a resolution, the parties are no worse off because they 
may still take advantage of arbitration or litigation.”  Barker, supra note 140, at 10.  This assessment 
is overly optimistic because it ignores the potentially disastrous consequences that delays can have in 
the commercial world.  The time taken to engage in a good-faith effort to mediate could cost a 
company significantly more than is worth the questionable outcome of the attempt.  Additionally, at 
this point in the conflict, it is probable that the parties have engaged in negotiations to resolve the 
issue amicably, likely with the help of sophisticated counsel, which makes successful mediation 
even less likely. 
 158. Though preservation of party relationships is usually not a prioritized practice of 
arbitration and is generally seen as a key benefit of mediation, there are arbitral techniques that focus 
on future contracts.  For example, interest arbitrators are “expected . . . to devise the actual contract 
provisions that will bind the parties during a future term.”  Rau, supra note 81, at 473.  This type of 
arbitration, however, is generally not chosen in the international commercial context because the 
resulting contractual relationship is usually not as important as the resolution of the immediate issue.  
Id. 
 159. Steele, supra note 19, at 1393. 
 160. Id. at 1394. 
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it, excluding, for the most part, mediation agreements, unless they have been 
approved by a court.161  Because mediation is classified as a 
“noncompulsory process,” even the clauses that commit parties to its 
procedures are given less force than arbitration clauses.162 
Though mediation has not overtaken arbitration in the way that 
arbitration replaced litigation,163 its value is not unknown.  “Increasing 
academic and professional interest in other ADR methods is, to a great 
extent, a reaction to arbitration’s deteriorating technical advantages, since 
 
 161. Id.  There has been much debate over the meaning of “binding” and whether it can be 
extended to mediation agreements interpreted as contracts, though international legal trends suggest 
that the Convention should be limited solely to arbitral awards.  Id. at 1396-97.  Though it would be 
ideal to assume that as voluntary settlements, mediation agreements would be voluntarily carried 
out, the failure to establish an enforcement mechanism would be naïve and ignorant of the realities 
that often follow amicable resolutions.  Id. at 1387. 
 162. Id. at 1399.  Regarding the comparatively voluntary nature of arbitration and mediation, 
“[b]oth arbitration and mediation require consent to initiate the process, but mediation participants 
retain the right to terminate the process at any time.  Once parties initiate arbitration, they are bound 
by the arbitrator’s decision.”  Id. at 1399 n.87 (citing Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for 
Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 589 
(2005)). 
 
Mediation is a fundamentally different process than arbitration. . . . The decision of 
whether to settle and on what terms is left to the parties.  Mediation convening and due 
process standards are unique because the mediator does not bear binding decision 
authority.  Since agreement is made by consent, parties are generally free to create value 
with their settlement-for example, by developing new business relationships that were not 
originally contemplated. 
 
Steele, supra note 19, at 1399.  See also NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 20, at 341 (“An 
arbitral tribunal may only validly resolve those disputes that the parties have agreed that it should 
resolve.  This rule is an inevitable and proper consequence of the voluntary nature of arbitration.  In 
consensual arbitration, the authority or competence of the arbitral tribunal comes from the agreement 
of the parties; indeed, there is no other source from which it can come.”).  This is a reflection of the 
principle that alternative dispute resolution methods are primarily creatures of contract and only 
extend as far as the parties have consented by agreement.  Stipanowich Interview, supra note 47. 
 163. Though the number of cases filed for ADR with the ICC doubled in 2009 as compared to 
the past seven years (90% of which were referred to mediation), the total came to twenty-four 
compared to the record 817 arbitration cases filed.  Statistical Report, supra note 146.  While the 
number of ADR cases has been steadily rising, so has the number of arbitration cases, indicating the 
tenacious hold that arbitration retains in the world of international disputes.  Unlike litigation, it 
appears that its influence is unlikely to fade in the near future.  But see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, 
Mediation: The “New Arbitration” (Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1713928), 
available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713928&http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstract_id=1713928 (suggesting that arbitration’s popularity is decreasing in favor of 
mediation). 
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the institution can no longer be indisputably regarded as the cheap, 
expeditious, and informal mechanism it was once advertised to be.”164  
Arbitration is being substantially changed by mediation; with more 
mediation hearings before arbitration, cases are increasingly settled, which 
reduces the need for arbitration.165 
With mediation as a rising dispute resolution trend, however, the 
concern is for it to truly follow the path of arbitration, and to lose its 
effectiveness in the quagmire of misuse and overregulation.166  The natural 
tendency for legal procedures is for them to become rigid and reflexive 
because lawyers are formal and process-oriented, and as processes grow, 
they change.167  While this change may not be deliberate, it comes with the 
experience of using mediation, and does not necessarily have to have a 
negative effect.168  Arbitration has evolved to be the method it is today, and 
though it is no longer as fast as it once was, it is not necessarily less 
efficient,169 and may even afford greater justice because of the increased 
attention to procedural and substantive fairness.  Thus, mediation will evolve 
into its role as it rises as a choice for the resolution of international 
commercial disputes. 
The key issue with the contention between mediation and arbitration is 
that their respective supporters tend to see them as mutually exclusive 
instead of being more or less appropriate in particular types of situations.170  
Rather than sharing the spotlight, they are viewed as competitors for the 
 
 164. Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under 
the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 438 (2000). 
 165. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48. 
 166. There are two uses for arbitration that Shalakany denotes in his commentary: technical and 
political.   Shalakany, supra note 164, at 434.  Though he readily admits that the technical uses for 
arbitration have significantly devolved, he cautions the reader against underestimating the lasting 
political effects of arbitration.  Id. 
 
[A]rbitration’s political advantages . . . are yet intact and growing all the more 
indispensable with the current surge of foreign investments in emerging markets.  The 
most serious residual advantages of arbitration thus appear to be political, chief among 
which is arbitration’s ability to offer a legitimating medium for the effective 
disempowerment of national legislative potentials. 
 
Id.  “However, ADR advocates usually disregard arbitration’s political advantages—advantages that 
both comprise and far surpass those of alternative ADR mechanisms.”  Id. at 438. 
 167. Stipanowich Interview, supra note 48. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Barker, supra note 139, at 8 (supporting an in-text quote by a Canadian law professor 
who stated that mediation is the way for international commercial disputes). 
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vacancy that litigation left when it was pushed aside in favor of ADR 
methods. 
CONCLUSION 
From its very beginnings, arbitration has been developed to serve the 
noble cause of keeping peace between international parties.  Though the 
nature of these conflicts has evolved significantly, the practice is still in use, 
and has risen to a position of international notoriety for its famed cheaper, 
faster, and more effective and final results.  With arbitration’s more 
widespread use, however, the need to adapt its benefits to more kinds of 
conflicts has converted these benefits into detriments that are deplored by 
champions of other forms of dispute resolution. 
The start of international commercial arbitration can be found in 
Western Europe, which practices primarily civil law techniques.  With the 
increased economic interaction between countries, disputes began to arise, 
and the impracticalities of global litigation were quickly revealed.  The key 
problems—impracticality of enforcement, long duration, legal and cultural 
barriers, amongst others—saw a solution with arbitration, and it was 
developed through the attention of arbitral institutions and international 
treaties. 
The ratification of the New York Convention by the United States led to 
an increase in American involvement, which subsequently led to accusations 
of “Americanization” of the international commercial arbitration system.  
Though admittedly U.S. litigation techniques have found their way into 
arbitration practices, the fact that they are retained suggests that they have 
had a more positive influence than not. 
That arbitration proceedings are becoming lengthier, more expensive, 
and more varied throughout the world has been credited to involvement by 
U.S. attorneys.  To assert, however, that U.S. participation has single-
handedly destroyed the effectiveness of arbitration is irresponsible, 
especially given the positive impact that it has had on the two techniques 
discussed; this connection even proposes the idea that if any positive 
changes are to come to international commercial arbitration, perhaps they 
should come from the United States. 
Other factors must be taken into consideration as well, and the rise of 
nationalization and overregulation of arbitration proceedings are more likely 
to be the culprits.  Government-led companies are susceptible to more 
claims than those that are privately owned, and so are more likely to try to 
tweak proceedings to protect themselves at the expense of their efficiency.  
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Additionally, the application of arbitration to a wider variety of disputes 
requires more specific, stringent rules, which by their very nature deprive 
parties of the ability to manipulate the process. 
With its notable success and domestic popularity in many countries, 
including the United States, arbitration will not likely be ruled obsolete, at 
least in the near future.  However, its benefits in the international arena are 
quickly eroding, making way for other types of dispute resolution to replace 
it as it replaced litigation.  It is important to recognize the fate of 
international commercial arbitration, if not to revive it, then to prevent the 
same deterioration of its potential successor. 
Mediation has attempted to rise to the position of that successor, 
claiming superficially distinguishing characteristics that are actually inherent 
to the flexibility of arbitration.  With its increasing attention, however, 
mediation runs the risk of falling victim to its own advantages of which 
arbitration has been found guilty. 
Rather than try to replace arbitration, mediation should fall into its own 
niche, and the value of each should be recognized for its potential.  For all of 
the pros and cons of the processes, arbitration is ultimately most valuable for 
resolving conflicts that are time-sensitive and often routine.  Mediation, on 
the other hand, is beneficial in situations where relationships need to be 
preserved, the disputes are less pressing, and the outcome should be more 
careful and detailed in its treatment of each party.  Thus, each of the 
procedures is appropriate in its own context, which shifts the responsibility 
to the legal community to determine what the parties’ interests are and 
which method is more appropriate for the situation. 
Creation through contract, using this system of assigning arbitration and 
mediation, would still be effective; clauses could simply state that matters 
pertaining directly to the terms of the original contract would be resolved 
through arbitration, while other disputes, such as future contracts or 
subsequent negotiations, could be referred to mediation. 
Arbitration is already beginning to show signs of wear and tear from 
misuse because it is being overly employed in too many inappropriate 
situations.  The key to preserving ADR processes is to use them properly, as 
the rules governing each are designed to apply to the types of conflicts for 
which they are designed.  The beauty of their flexibility is that if there does 
need to be a change made, it can be so done without detrimentally affecting 
the process.  The carelessness with which arbitration has been treated as it 
has been flung into every conceivable contract has deteriorated the process.  
By realizing this problem, the legal community can take a proactive 
approach to prevent the successive decline of every ADR process when it is 
brought in to replace the previous technique, starting with the prevention of 
arbitration from going the way of the Greeks. 
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